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The Affective turn, or Getting Under the Skin
Nerves: Revisiting Stelarc
Jan Jagodzinski
Jan Jagodzinski konzentriert sich dabei auf das 0,3-Sekunden-
Intervall, das aus neurowissenschaftlicher Sicht zwischen einer
Empﬁndung  auf  der  Haut  und  deren  Wahrnehmung  durch
das  Gehirn  verstreicht.  Dieses  Intervall  wird  derzeit  in  der
Biokunst  durch  neue  Medientechnologien  erkundet.  Der
bekannte Performance-Künstler Stelarc steht beispielhaft für
diese Erkundungen. Am Ende des Beitrags erfolgt eine kurze
Reﬂexion  über  die  Bedeutung  dieser  Arbeiten  für  die
Medienpädagogik.
The  'affective  turn'  has  begun  to  penetrate  all  forms  of
discourses. This essay attempts to theorize affect in terms of
the  'intrinsic  body,'  that  is,  the  unconscious  body  of
proprioceptive  operations  that  occur  below  the  level  of
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cognition.  I  concentrate  on  the  gap  of  0.3  seconds  that
neuroscience  posits  as  the  time  taken  before  sensation  is
registered through the skin to the brain. which I maintain has
become  the  interval  that  is  currently  being  explored  by
bioartists  through new media  technologies.  The  well-known
performance artist Stelarc is the exemplary case for such an
exploration. The essay ends with a brief reﬂection what this
means for media pedagogy.
The skin is faster than the word (Massumi 2004: 25).
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The  “affective  turn”  has  been  announced,[1] but  what  exactly  is  it?
Basically, it is an exploration of an “implicit” body. It is worth the risk to
claim that  affect  can be at  times synonymous with jouissance,  libidinal
energy and zoē (as opposed to bios which is already under the level of
the  signiﬁer)  depending  on  the  discourse  one  ﬁnds  oneself  in.  Brian
Massumi  (2002)  presents  perhaps  the  best  account  throughout  his
Parables of the Virtual, which has become a ground-breaking book for this
question.  It  is  the  very  autonomy of  affect,  as  the  title  of  the  seminal
chapter[2] explores,  which  is  at  issue;  the  signiﬁcance  of  the
approximately 0.3 seconds of temporality that neuroscience informs us
the body takes to process the sensory information it has received through
the skin’s surface. The shock is that the body “knows” before there is an
active response. The brain and the skin resonate with one another at an
unconscious  level,  which  is  not  under  our  control.  The  will,  and
consciousness  in  this  scenario  are  after  the  fact  events,  subtractive
functions that reduce the potentially overwhelming complexity of sensory
stimulation.  The  emergence  of  mind as  conscious  reﬂection  acting  on
what  the  body  has  already  “infolded”  follows.  This  realm  opens  the
Deleuzian door for Massumi to refer to it as a virtual unconscious domain
of stored potentiality, haunted as it were, by the Bergsonian development
of memory, which is also without “location” but impacts precisely within
this virtual interval as well. It is a paradoxical realm where opposites co-
exist,  can  coalesce  and  hence  connect.  Such  a  description  addresses
Deleuze’s  explorations  of  the  “logic  of  sense”  that  are  consistent  with
Freud’s own claims that the unconscious knows no negation, and that the
primary (instinctual) processes have a temporality of their own.[3]
Massumi  “deﬁnition”  is  that  affect  is  an  incipient  force  of  intensity;
drawing on complexity theory, affect in this discourse becomes the point
when a structure dissipates, transforms after one potential is actualized
or expressed from a multiplicity of potentialities. In Lacanian terms, we
can call this an exchange of the three psychic orders coming together in
particular complex forms of organization. Why not? Drawing on Gilbert
Simondon’s (1992) inﬂuential theory of (collective) individuation, Massumi
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articulates affect as essentially the intertwining of “implicit” and “explicit”
forms – this  follows the Deleuzian virtual/actual  intra-relation or David
Bohm’s (1980) “implicate” and “explicate” orders. The potentiality of the
implicit  body (virtually  infolded interactions that are in-tension) is  then
actualized  (unfolded)  as  expression.  We  can  only  grasp  affect  in  its
actualization – its virtual potential is obviously unconscious to us. Hence,
such an expression marks the functional limitation of its potential. Affect
is autonomous to the extent it participates in the virtual and to the degree
that it  escapes conﬁnement,  necessary for any organism to “live.”  It  is
troubling  when  complexity  theory  becomes  its  own  form  of
instrumentalism,  swallowing  up  homo  sapiens  as  simply  the  most
complex organisms within an assemblage – this leads to the diﬃcult road
of bio-ethics.[4]
It is possible now to switch gears and ground what is diﬃcult theory as
offered by Simondon and Massumi, amongst others, concerning affect –
to  eventually  position Stelarc’s  singular  diagram in  relation to  his  own
sinthome – as to what “drives” his unthought. One way to do this is to
identify the “missing virtual temporality” (0.3 seconds) with the present
“now”  that  belongs  to  an  implicit  body  –  the  body  schema,  which  is
different  but  integrated  with  the  more  common  body image.[5] While
often  confused  with  the  body  image,  the  former  belongs  to  the  non-
representational implicit body, while the latter is the explicit body at the
level  of  representation.  Both,  obviously  are  complexly  inter  and  intra-
related. Placed in Lacanian terms, we are simply referring to the Real and
the Imaginary respectively. The body schema involves a system of motor
capacities,  abilities  and  habits  that  enable  movement  and  the
maintenance of posture. All these are non-conscious processes affected
by memory. The body schema is not a perception, a belief, or an attitude,
but a system of motor and postural functions that operate below the level
of self-referentiality, as preconscious, subpersonal processes carried out
tacitly as keyed to the environment.
This  body  scheme  –  the  phenomenal  body[6] that  is  aligned  with
proprioception – when grasped as being in(formed) by the skin-ego, as
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worked  out  by  Didier  Anzieu  and  Esther  Bick,[7] opens  up  more
interesting speculation. Freud’s well-known assertion – “The ego is ﬁrst
and foremost a bodily ego; it is not merely a surface entity, but itself the
projection of a surface” (1961: 26) – can be interpreted along two lines: as
surface and as projection – non-representationally and representationally.
To  read  Anzieu’s  skin-ego  as  surface,  non-representationally,  is  to
recognize  an  emerging  psyche  of  the  implicit  body  –  the  body  of  the
affective drives – that are forming an emerging sense of a core self.[8] The
body-ego is a latter development, coming with the spectacularization of
the  “I”,  the  sense  of  the  “self  versus the  Other,”  as  Stern  puts  it,  an
“alienating moment” in the infant’s development that is overcome as it
moves towards a social “I” with the acquisition of language – the self with
the  Other  (1985:  69).  As  such  there  is  an  interval,  frission,  or  écart,
between  the  skin-ego  and  body-ego,  between  the  dermis  and  the
epidermis,  between  the  passage  from  a  less  fragmenting  to  a  more
uniﬁed body image.  Skin-ego (implicit  body)  and the body-ego (explicit
body) are therefore non-identical. A gap separates them, which may well
be identiﬁed as “alienation.”[9]
While  all  three  psychic  registers  are  now  in  place:  Real  (skin-ego),
Imaginary  (body-ego)  and Symbolic  (super-ego),  the  point  to  be  made
here is that Lacan’s “body in pieces” is misplaced, or arrives too late on
the  scene.  An  affective-sensate  core  self  emerges  before  the  famous
mirror stage, which already begins to “gather up” and organize the “pieces”
through the skin. There are immanent ontogenetic forces of nonorganic
life (not pertaining to the organs as a formed entity), a form of spirituality
(vital  effects)  at  “play”  at  this  level.  Deleuzeguattari’s  BwO  is  the  dis-
organized body – the ground zero of chaos, difference, duration as living
matter  with  its  genetic  “programs”  in  play.  The  BwO  (Body  without
Organs,  i.e.  "organloser  Körper  (oK)"  in  german)  is  continually  being
reconstructed by the “miracle” of forces we have no knowledge about. The
interval between BwO and the core self will always remain indeterminate.
It  would  be  like  asking  when  does  the  fetus  become  “human.”  The
disorganization of the BwO is the Real psychic order  – it is the “limit of
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the  lived  body,”  (Deleuze  2003:  44)  it  can’t  be  reached,  nor  can  it  be
attained.
Both  Anzieu  and  Bick  maintain  that  the  primordial  skin  touching  skin
(namely  the  baby with  nipple  in  its  mouth and being  held  during  the
processes of feeding) introjects a (non-representational) sensible being. In
the primal mode of passivity the infant experiences skin from the “inside”
– as a space within itself, and from the “outside” by introjecting the skin as
its boundary. The skin-ego (what Stern would call  a core self)  leans on
biological functions. The “sensate body” of the core ego forms as it begins
to grasp parts of the body-surface through the skin as it is slowly built up
– non-representationally since there is no stable referent.[10] This process
of development undergoes repeated disintegration and transformation as
RIG modalities  are formulated and memories  are encoded throughout
the body proper. If the phenomenal body is the body of affect, it is also
the body of distributed libidinal sexuality, and it is also the BwO as an egg-
formation  as  Deleuzeguattari  put  it,  “where  organs  are  distinguished
solely  by gradients,  migrations,  zones of  proximity.”  (2005:  182)  In  this
sense Anzieu and Bick’s skin-ego should be grasped as the originary (non-
representation)  container (the  “outside”  of  Deleuze’s  egg),  acting  as  an
envelope for  the formation of  vitality  affects  and as a  protective  shield
against  over  stimulation.  It  fulﬁlls  a  function  of  maintaining  the  (core)
psyche – an emerging subjective me which will differentiate itself from its
environment.[11]
It  is this affective-schematic-phenomenal-autonomic body, the core self
that is the site of the affective turn; for this body enveloped by the skin
ego  has  its  own  non-representation  imaging  potentials  that  become
coded and decoded through digitalized technologies.  As  such,  it  lends
itself  to  technological  exteriorization  because  of  this  potential,  what
Stiegler (1998)[12] calls the “epiphylogenic” evolution of the human which
starts as far back with the eolithic tools used by the Australopithecines,
the prosthetics  of  technics.  With  this  background we can now turn to
Stelarc, a performative artist who explores the implicit body by coding,
encoding and decoding it.
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Stelarc: Flesh Games in the Virtual Real
Our actions and ideas are essentially determined by our physiology
(Stelarc 1998: 117)
Hopefully, we are now in a position to say something about Stelarc and
then  end  this  section  of  how  a  great  deal  of  contemporary  art  (new
media)  interacts  with  such  affective  embodiment  –  Stelarc  being  the
extreme case. It could be said, in a skewed sort of way, to grasp Stelarc as
a diagrammatic ﬁgure is  to envision him as a three-dimensional ﬁgure
painted by Francis Bacon, who is equally convulsed and tortured by inner
forces,  only  here  those  forces  have  been  harnessed  through  the
prosthetics of technology within a synoptic assemblage. Stelarc’s diagram
opens up the implicit body, to the “ecstasies of chaos” – the forces that
deform it, producing disjunctions and breaks in the normal functioning of
his  organs.  The  psyche  of  the  skin-ego  undergoes  exteriorization.  “It”
comes out of its protective inner envelope, so to speak. Merleau-Ponty’s
“ﬂesh” is made “ﬂesh” through his machinic projections (1968). No wonder
life  “without  a  head”  –  the  zombie  or  mummy  –  fascinates  him.  To
paraphrase Stelarc,[13] “a corpse can now be indeﬁnitely preserved, while
a comatose body can be put on life support system. Further, a body can
be  cryogenetically  preserved  waiting  re-animation.  It  is  possible  to
engineer new kinds of chimeric architecture in vitro and grow tissues and
insert stem cell in vivo.” For Stelarc the cadaver, the comatose body and
the  chimeric  body  are  the  new  tropes  for  his  performances  where
biotechnology and nanotechnology come together. This is his current bio-
art work, which I brieﬂy discuss below.[14]
In many respects Stelarc’s interest in the plastinated body and the role of
technology as a body prosthesis comes dangerously close to becoming
the poster boy for designer capitalism, the apotheosis of technological
instrumentalism.  Massumi  identiﬁes  an  “operative  reason”  working
throughout  his  oeuvre  (2002:  109–112).  “Stelarc  applies  instrumental
reason – careful, calculated, medically-assisted procedure – to the body
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[face], taken as an object, in order to extend intelligence into space, by
means of suspension.” (99) What saves Stelarc is the utter “uselessness”
of his prosthetic extensions and a failure of instrumental reason as such.
Their  cyborgian extraterrestrial  possibilities seem remote,  although the
monstrosity  of  their  possibility is  not  foreclosed.  The  ambivalence  of
accusations of narcissism[15] and phallic jouissance, I believe rest on just
this tragicomic failure of what are new and unprecedented creations. As
such the promise of inventing a “people to come” (in the Deleuzian sense
of a “minor practice” (1986) encompasses all the cyborgian fantasies that
are pelted at him by his critics.
Stelarc has been performing since the mid-1970s. The literature by him
and about him and his performances is overwhelming. I focus on a series
of “phases” of his work to show an affective diagram that is shaped by a
Real sinthome.  By this I  mean, Stelarc’s performances are keyed to the
body of the drives – the sensate body of the mute skin-ego; there is no
lack – only a drive for jouissance.  As Massumi puts it,  Stelarc’s work “is
desire without an object […] desire as process.” (2002: 113) There seems
to  be  a  complete  exposure  of  the  skin-ego,  which  undergoes  various
intensiﬁcations  through  prostheticization  in  each  phase  –  as  such  the
charges by some critics of primary narcissism appears to hold.[16] It is
appropriate to say virtual Real once more, since it is the sensations of this
body  that  are  being  “imaged”  through  technological  means.  The
consistency of the bodily Imaginary is disrupted, more accurately – this
disruption  is  through  a  confrontation  with  the  body  schema.  The
Symbolic order, on the other hand, is shown to be limited. The human
body is “obsolete” he claims. “The hollow body would be a better host for
technological  components.”[17] In  an  artistic  statement  from  1988  he
writes: “What is important is the body as an object, not a subject – not
being a particular someone but rather becoming something else” (quoted
in: Massumi 2002: 99, emphasis added). His name, “Stelarc,” an obvious
pseudonym,  stands  in  and  ﬁlls  the  Symbolic’s  lack  through  his
prosthetically and biologically enhanced body. In Lacanian terms, Stelarc
presents phallic jouissance where enjoyment is transgressively stolen from
the Other – the Ideal ego that is (in this case) taken to be deﬁcient. Stelarc
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has  no  interest  in  the  representational  body  caught  by  gender,
transsexuality,  personality,  the  psyche,  and  any  forms  of
transcendentalism  or  metaphysics  that  shape  other  dimensions  of
contemporary  art.  Nor  are  his  prosthetics  understood  as  forms  of
substitution – as replacement parts or organs for an (already) organized
body, rather prosthetics are extensions that tap into the “pure potential”
(virtuality) of the body. This is what is sought. It is the exploration of the
body in its 0.3 seconds processing interval that intrigues him.[18]
Diagrammatic Phases
Brian  Massumi,  a  fellow  countryman  of  Stelarc,  whose  widely
disseminated commentary on him, “The Evolutionary Alchemy of Reason,”
[19] I draw on to make my case, calls his body medium the exploration of
a “sensible  concept.”  Stelarc’s  attempt is  to show how the implicit  body
thinks. The series of phases of Stelarc’s work takes, forms a diagram that
develops from his Skin Suspension series (16 suspensions in all that take
a full  eleven years to “resolve”)  through to a “prosthetic”  phase,  which
then  moves  into  a  “cyborg”  phase  and  lastly  to  bioart.  The  trajectory
moves rhizomatically and through an “involution,” that is to say, there is a
certain exhaustion in the skin suspension problematic and a new phase
emerges.
The ﬁrst phase of the diagram consisted in his body (skin) suspensions.
These required no audience, nor did any sorts of notices, manifestos or
written explanations accompany them: the imaginary (audience) and the
usual  social  (signiﬁers)  were  ‘suspended;’  they  fell  out  of  importance.
Suspending  the  body  with  hooks  through  the  skin,  in  mid-air,  was
carefully and instrumentally thought out. By defying gravity, the body was
rendered  ‘useless,’  non-functional.  Suspension  now  takes  on  another
meaning,  for  the  body  becomes  dysfunctional,  unable  to  move  and
extend  itself.  What  is  being  suspended  then  is  “embodied  human
possibility”  (Massumi 2002:  101–102).  Such a problematic  –  the object-
body as a limit state in space – presents itself as a serial unfolding, each
performance  leading  into  the  next.  Why  these  suspensions  can  be
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considered to  be in the virtual  Real  is  because there is  an impossible
“stilling” of the body within a present moment of time (0.3 seconds) that is
continuously  being  ﬁlled  with  jouissance  (pure  sensation),  pure
potentiality, or multiplicity. There is no ‘future’ (no action for this body),
only  a  serialization  of  past  (equally  but  singularly different)  body
suspensions.[20] Stelarc  overlays  or  supplements  the  early  inductive,
more self-contained,  suspensions by having the sensate body begin to
“express”  itself  through  technology.  The  implicit  body  becomes  a
transducer, at ﬁrst his body converting the invisible gravity into the visible
pattern as ripples and hills of his hook-stretched skin, which subsequently
called  a  “gravitational  landscape.”  The  force  of  gravity  on  his  body
eventually began to be transduced by the sounds of his inner body – the
rush  of  his  blood  and  the  beating  of  his  heart.  The  body  now  also
becomes  “sonic  architecture”  as  sound  ﬁlled  the  room  where  the
suspension took pace. This ends the ﬁrst phase.[21]
Phase  two  can  be  covered  under  the  signiﬁer:  prosthesis.  Massumi
identiﬁes this phase as “the sensible concept as extension”  (2002: 116).
The prosthetic projects like Bug Goggles, the Third Hand, Extended Arm, and
Exoskeleton belong to it. The turn to prosthetics here has nothing to do
with the “natural” body lacking, or the usual understanding of replacing
body parts  and organs,  but  raises  the question of  evolution itself.  We
have always been prosthetic creatures through the technologies of our
own  invention:  to  the  degree  that  the  body  itself  is  a  prosthetic
(composed  of  matter)  and  open  to  a  symbiotic  relation  to  things,  it
becomes modiﬁable. This phase is extended when the formerly passive
audience begins to be let into his performances, a shift to “the sensible
concept  as  contagion”  (ibid.,  emphasis  added).  Beginning  with  Fractal
Flesh,  Split  Body:  Voltage-In/Voltage  Out,  Stelarc  succeeds  in  the  intense
transfer  of  the  body as  a  “sensible  concept”  through contagion to  his
audience through an elaborate computer relay system that controlled his
left-side movements,  while  he remained in  control  of  his  robotic  right
arm,  staging  an  elaborate  entwinement  of  human  will  and  machinic
control.[22] The  body’s  inner  ﬂows  were  audibly  transducted  as  well.
“Contagion”  suggests  that  his  performance  infected  the  audience,
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penetrated it at the neuronal level. It didn’t necessarily matter under what
signiﬁer(s)  any one body was identiﬁed by: Black,  White,  Male,  Female,
Hetero, Queer and so on. These performances were intense enough for
penetration to have happened at the embodied sensual levels, shocking
them, as it were.
Stelarc emerges at the end of this second phase as a ‘split’ body (rather
than a Lacanian ‘split’ self). He then moves into an extended phase. Such
projects  as  PingBody, Parasite,  and  Movatar have  network  participation
through a remote global audience. His ‘split body’ becomes manipulated
by them via the Internet bringing the audience into a loop where they see
visually the dance of his body to the data that is running through it. The
force  of  information  in  and  on  his  body  is,  once  again  transduced,
expressed through visual feedback loops and sounds as it moves, caught
between the ‘will’ of the audience and his own ‘will.’ Massumi refers to this
phase as evolution. This, of course, raises the specter of Stelarc’s sinthome,
that which drives his artistic process, which raises the unthought of his
work.  Paradoxically,  Massumi  theorizes  Stelarc’s  technological
“uselessness” as performing the “conditions of evolution,” (2002: 125) not
evolution itself.  For Deleuzeguattari,  it  is the intensity of involution,  the
creative turbulence at the molecular level that produces the inexplicable
gaps over limitless time. Stelarc projects a “postevolutionary evolution of
the human,”  (ibid.)  says  Massumi,  meaning that  Stelarc’s  conditions  of
evolution are the potentialities that have yet to be actualized in the next
phase of our species – the posthuman.
The same might be said of the current phase of his work – Extra Ear: Ear
on Armproject (2006–2007), Walking Head Robot (2006), Blender (2005, with
Nina Sellars). We might extend Massumi and call it the “sensible concept
of  postevolution”  –  now further  explored as  bioart,  which was already
nascent  in  the  previous  phase,  as  is  the  case  with  each  phase:  the
infolding  and  unfoldings  of  the  performances.  “All  of  the  phases  and
events are present, potentially and differentially in each other.” (Massumi
2002: 125) The Extra Ear is no longer a receiving organ but a transmitting
organ; like Telepolis, the Ear will wirelessly transmit sounds to the Internet
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becoming  a  remote  listening  device  (a  microphone  will  eventually  be
implanted in the arm at the site of the Ear).  The Partial  Head (inspired
from the  Prosthetic  Head,  2003)  is  generated  from  the  “image  of  the
ﬂattened digitalized skin that had been made for the Prosthetic Head.”
[23] Stelarc face was scanned along with a hominid skull. Stelarc’s human
face becomes digitally transplanted over this skull  with thermal plastic,
over which are seeded living cells, thereby a third face is constructed. This
Partial  Head,  which  Stelarc  names  post-humanoid  and  pre-human  in
form, was incubated in a life-support system but became contaminated
within a week and ended up being preserved in formaldehyde.[24] I end
here.  Stelarc’s  performative  output  raises  questions  that  surround
bioethics through the ‘postevolutionary’ question concerning the ‘death’
of  his  Third  Face.  It  once  more  raises  the  impossible  question of  just
where  life  begins  and  ends,  and  who  is  responsible  if  the  ‘human’  is
swallowed up entirely in a machinic assemblage of biocyberneticism.[25]
Tapping into the implicit body – the body “under the skin” – via technology
has become a line of ﬂight in contemporary art where the gallery visitor
interacts with the computerized environments that are engineered to be
explored. The most interesting artists obviously explore the implicit body
in  unique  ways.[26] But  few,  if  any,  raise  the  bar  of  ethico-political
problematic of AI, technology, and bioart as does Stelarc.
Pedagogically this development offers both liberation and a danger for
the future of  media studies.  Bioartists  exploring the intrinsic  body are
able to engage the viewer’s body in the digitalized installations that they
design so that both the perception (extrinsic body) in conjunction with the
proprioceptive system (intrinsic body) are thrown into disjunctive state to
achieve  dramatic  effects.  When  viewers  pass  by  one  of  Bill  Viola’s
installations of  his  Passion series,  such as the Quintet  of  the Astonished
(2000), they are uncertain whether the ﬁgures are ‘still’ or actually moving.
They must wait patiently to see the ﬁgures ever so slowly changing and
thus offering new insights into the nature of perception. The view must 
slow down his  or  her  movement  to  be  affected.  Spinoza’s  concept  of
affect, as developed in his Ethics maintains: “By [affect] I understand the
affections of the body by which the body’s power of activity is increased
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or diminished, assisted or checked.” (2002: 278) Affect is not restricted to
what is felt, but is linked with the capacities of an object, the human being
in this case. Viola’s digitalized video expands the capacities of the body.
This is the upside of these explorations. Pedagogically they open up new
worlds for conscious exploration. They enrich our grasp of the ﬂeeting
nature of all perception, the way it continually abstracts and frames what
we  see.  The  downside,  however,  is  that  designer  capitalism  has  also
latched onto this affective intrinsic body in order to increase consumption
of goods. A good example here is Schmitt (1999) who explores the way
customers’  sense,  feel,  think,  act  and  relate  so  that  this  unconscious
aspect of the body is tapped for marketing strategies. This means that the
future of media pedagogy has to become much more familiar with the
manipulations of both the market and bioartistic explorations of the body
unconscious.
Remarks:
[1] For example, Patricia Clough seems to have established herself in this
area.  See  Clough  (2008)  and  (2007).  However,  earlier  Anu  Koivunen
published “Preface: The affective turn?” (2001).
[2] Published earlier as “The Autonomy of Affect” (Massumi 1996).
[3] This  also  opens  the  door  to  Jan  Campbell’s  re-reading  of  Freud in
maintaining,  mentioned  earlier,  that  he  too  has  a  notion  of  the  non-
psychological unconscious similar to what is being presented by Deleuze,
and  Jean  François  Lyotard  as  well  who  developed  his  own  Freudian
variant  – the affect phase unconscious. See Lyotard (1991).
[4] Here I would ﬂag two important articles: Mitchell’s “The Work of Art in
an Age of Biocybernetic Reproduction” (2003) and Michael Dillon and Luis
Lobo-Guerreo’s  “The  Biopolitical  Imagination  of  Species  Being”  (2009).
Both  articles  raise  the  ethical  questions  that  surround  genetic
experimentation in art and in the larger molecular and digital revolution
of life.
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[5] The  distinction  between  body  schema  (non-representational)  and
body  image  (representational)  is  articulated  by  Shaun  Gallager  and
Jonathan Cole “Body Image and Body Schema in a Deafferented Subject”
(1995)..
[6] Hansen  claims  that  Merleau-Ponty’s  schema  corporel (phenomenal
body) has been wrongly translated as body image. See Hansen (2006: 38).
[7] Esther  Bick’s  research  on  the  importance  of  skin  in  infant-mother
relations was an independent development from Anzieu who built on her
work, modifying and changing some of her premises. For a review of her
work see Wiloughby (2001).
[8] The notion of “sense of” is crucial here since this is not a conceptual or
cognitive notion of self, but an experiential sense of events. The organized
sense of a core self includes: self-agency, self-coherence, self-affectivity,
and self-history (memory). See Stern (1985: 71).
[9] Where a major disagreement exists between Lacan and Merleau-Ponty
is the question surrounding the moment of alienation experienced by the
infant around 2–3 months. For Lacan this becomes a paranoid moment
that ends up as a lack that becomes a perpetual struggle for recognition
in the symbolic order, whereas for Merleau-Ponty, this alienation is not
paranoiac  but  productive.  It  is  an  ongoing  dimension  of  the  implicit
(introceptive) body. We can say it is the moi formed through in-tensions of
skin-ego  and  body  ego.  So  while  the  earlier  Lacan  forwarded  the
alienating aspect of the mirror stage, the “later” Lacan would be more
sympathetic  to  the  phenomenological  position  of  alienation  as  the
interval where Real and the Imaginary are continually in play regarding
the symbolic – the sinthomatic position.
[10] This is where the metaphysical aspects of genetics enter into play
since there is no representational “blue print,” if I can put it this way. The
body “knows” how to form itself.
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[11] This is extrapolated from Claudia Bethien’s very interesting book on
the  history  of  skin  where  she  calls  on  Anzieu’s  work  throughout.  See
Benthien (2002: esp. footnote 4, 243–245).
[12] Stiegler  explores  the  history  of  technics  as  epiphylogenesis.  This
marks a break with genetic evolution, which has no way of preserving the
“lessons” of experience which technics offers. This is crucial for the “new
media”  of  contemporary  art  where  technics  is  part  of  the  interactive
process.
[13] Paraphrased from a YouTube performance.
[14] An artist like Damien Hirst ﬁgures promptly here, with his “glass box”
art  with  pickled  and  preserved  biological  specimens:  from the  pickled
shark to bisected cows and embryos. As does Antony Gromley’s Sovereign
State – a concrete sculpture of the artist’s body lying in the fetal position
with rubber hoses attached into and out of his oriﬁces as a self-sustained
comatose human body,  a  neo-mort,  speaks directly  to the dystopia of
“biocybernetic art” (see Mitchell 2003: 496). Also, Justine Cooper’s RAPT I
and RAPT II  (1998) is an installation piece that uses 76 “slices” or “MRI
scans mounted individually onto Perplex and hung so as to produce an
entire image sculpture of Cooper’s databody.” See Munster (2006: 143–
144).
[15] Benthien  reads  Stelarc’s  skin  performances  as  “continually  giving
birth to himself.” (2002: 233).
[16] Benthien ends her book Skin (2002: 234) by addressing Stelarc as a
paradoxical ﬁgure where his use of technology at ﬁrst “shatters the body,”
[skin suspensions] but then returns to “reintegrate its fragments” [cyborg
phase].
[17] As posted on his website (www.stelarc.va.com.au/). But this claim is
already found in his early performances.
[18] Massumi  develops  prosthetics  as  substitution  vs.  extension  in
Parables  of  the  Virtual (2002:  126–127).  When  discussing  Stelarc’s
prosthetics, Joanna Zylinska sees the potential of a prosthetic ethics that
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goes  beyond  self-possession  and  autonomy  pointing  to  “relationships
with alterity and exteriority.” (2002: 216)
[19] This essay appears as chapter 4 in his Parables of the Virtual, but it
goes back to 1995 and versions of it can be found in many sites online.
On “sensible concept” (2002: 90).
[20] There  was  only  one suspension  where  Stelarc  hoisted  himself  up
using  his  (third  extended)  arm  on  a  pulley;  this  counter-gravitational
performance displaced movement from his legs to his arms, conﬁrming
the divergent split between matter of sensation and “organic” perception-
action.
[21] The most extreme suspension, a suspension that under any other
name would be considered a form of postmodern torture, was where all
his bodily expression was radically closed down – being voluntarily buried
alive might get at the magnitude of this performance – comparable to
David  Blaine  or  Criss  Angel  who  bill  themselves  as  magicians  and
endurance artists. Stelarc’s body was put between two planks, eyes and
mouth sewn shut, suspended from a pole and in the evening taken down
and laid on rocks for  seventy-ﬁve hours.  Sensation would implode his
body to a  point  which would become unbearable,  the danger I  would
suspect that the skin-ego could no longer contain the bodily resonances
and vibrations. Stelarc would “crack.” This is as close as one might get to
the BwO at its zero level – even the living dead as mummy or zombie is
unbearably stilled.
[22] Stelarc’s  comment  on  this  performance  when  his  body  was  split
between  voltage-in  and  voltage-out  can  now  be  grasped.  “That
performance surprised me. I was watching my limbs moving in space. I’ve
neither willed that action nor am I contracting my muscles to perform
that action. That action is occurring beside, before, it predates myself as a
free agent. In other words, half of my body has nothing to do with my free
agency […] I was looking in sort of wonderment.” (Quoted in Jones and
Soﬁa 2002: 60).
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[23] The paraphrased description comes from his website on the Partial
Head (www.stelarc.va.com.au/partialhead/index.html).
[24] Referred to as tansgenetic art by some (Eduardo Kac’s Genesis 1999
seems to be the ground work here).
[25] See  Zylinska  (2009).  Such  artist  cells  as  Critical  Art  Ensemble
(www.critical-art.net/) have staged biotech critical performances, as have
Rtmark (www.rtmark.com/).
[26] Two outstanding articles in this regard do a wonderful review of what
is possible here. See Ridgway and Stern (2009) and Wegenstein (2004),
also  Munster  (2006).  In  chapter  ﬁve,  Munster  does  a  nice  review  of
contemporary interactive art, discussing such well-known works as Huge
Harry. Also Mark Hansen’s discussion of Myron Krueger interactive work is
crucial for making a distinction between those artist who have not fallen
into the technicity of VR and CAVE environments, and new media artists
such as  Krueger  who ﬁnd ways  to  creatively  interact  with  the  implicit
body. (See Hansen 2006: 25–38)
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